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The crisis in El Salvador has evolved through several
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contenders, resulting in a reassessment of relative
positions and a new phase. This has led to the present
condition in which the major actors are realizing that the
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I. INTRODUCTION
Speaking before the general assembly of the United
Nations on 8 October 1984, President Jose Napolean Duarte,
of El Salvador, made the remarkable gesture of proposing
direct dialogue between his government and insurgent forces
.
This proposal was the most signifigant public action in
moving toward a settlement of the civil war that has raged
in the country for over 5 years. Even though the talks at
La Palma that resulted from this announcment produced no
agreements of substance, the underlying factors involved
were of considerable signifigance
.
The fact that Duarte was able to make the announcement
as well as carry out the proposal indicates a notable shift
in perceptions and positions of powerful factions involved.
In a country that has historically been governed by military
rulers controled by a conservative oligarchy, this type of
manuever has never been allowed. Duarte 's predecessor,
Alvaro Magana, the year before was faced with a string of
highly publicized death squad killings as a response to just
such an attempt. 1 Conservative bussiness and political
groups as well as the military had consistently opposed
negotiations with the rebels. It was considered to be a
"trap" which would provide the insurgents an opportunity to
gain strength through an increased public image as well as
time to plan and organize further attacks.
President Duarte in his campaign for election had sought
popular support by promising to pursue talks with the
rebels. However, after being elected, he seemed to be going
back on his word by stating the conditions were not right
: New York Times, 9 October, 1984.
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for a meeting. An aide explained that "the government
cannot move toward negotiations with the leftists before
there is a concensus on that course within the army and on
the right". 2 The sudden initiation of direct talks,
surprising even his supporters, was said to have received
the support of the army high command and conservative
political leaders. 3 Attendance at the talks by Defense
Minister Vides Cassanova tends to confirm this fact.
In addition to peace talks , Duarte campaigned on
promises of social and economic reform: land
redistribution; judicial reform; human rights. All familiar
ideals that had been voiced by leaders before, only to be
squelched by the Salvadoran reality of conservative
obstructionism. The most recent example was the junta
formed after the Major's Coup of 1979, whose failure to
produce promised reforms has been attributed with
responsibility for driving the moderate left into coalition
with radical groups.'*
This political left has removed itself from the
legitimate political system because of a total loss of faith
in the system to provide neccessary changes, believing that
only through radical restructuring of institutions can
reform be acheived. They view the Duarte administration as
another facade of democracy, hiding the real military
dictatorship, controlled by oligarchic interests. 5 Any
reforms made are only token actions that do not alter the
unjust system, exemplified by the demands of the FDR-FMLN in
response to the proposed talks, that the military high
2 New York Times, 2 September, 1984.
3 New York Times, 10 & 14 October, 1984
"LeoGrande,W. & Robbins , C. "Oligarchs and Officers; The
Crisis in El Salvador;" Foreign Affairs, V 58, No. 5, pp.
1084-88. 5
5 Ungo, Guillermd, "The People's Struggle;" Foreign
Policy
, No. 43, Summer 1981, pp. 51-63.
command be represented, as the army is the true wielder of
government power.
Conversely, proponents of the administration can point
out data that exemplify the advances made in reform:
successful land redistribution; radical reduction in
politically motivated deaths; and continuation of the
democratic electoral process begun in 1982. 6 The most recent
legislative elections in March especially favor Duarte's
record; the nearly 53% of the popular vote given the
Christian Democrats was a referendum on administration
policies and progress. The question then arises, is there
truly a transformation occurring in the political power
capabilities of the different factions? Have the
conservative forces been relegated to the minority
opposition role, or is the reactive backlash primed and
ready to strike down reform again? And what of the process
initiated at La Palma, can it lead to deeper negotiations
and an eventual resolution, or was it just a tactic in a
strategy designed to gain international and popular support
for the regime. It is within the framework of bargaining
theory that the relative strengths and potentials of
involved parties can best be analyzed and evaluated to
answer these questions.
6 Report on the Situation in El Salvador, (Dec 84 - Jan
85), Department of State, Washington DC.
8
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A signifigant theme evident in early Salvadoran history,
since the time Pedro de Alvarado conquered the region for
himself and Spain in 1524, is the development of an
exclusionary socio-political system, controlled by a
selective group, utilizing a moral form of ideological
justification for exploitation. The conquistadores did it
for God, country and honor. Their attitude of wealth and
strength of will equating to superiority was passed on to
the wealthy elite who assumed control of the country upon
independence. However, the higher ideals became
subordinated to more personalist goals. The guiding
principle became the capitalist ideals of freedom and
democracy; the rights of private property, sanctity of a
free, unregulated market, and the belief that the only
government intervention allowable was in protection of the
economy. If elections had to be rigged, or subversives
repressed to guarentee successful democracy, then so be it,
for they were the ones who were best able to judge and carry
out such things. The military then carried on the tradition
with their own interpretation of duty and honor; it was
their duty to protect the country from all threats to its
good order, and the sanctity of the military institution.
Following Mexico's example, El Salvador acheived
independence from Spain in 1821 as a part of the
captaincy-general of Guatemala. The ensuing years were
filled with repeated attempts at Central American union,
marked by conflicts between those favoring centralized
government similar to Spanish administration, and those
advocating a more anticlerical federalism. The latter group
finally predominated in El Salvador, and formalized their
liberal principles in the constitution of 1886. 7 Although
this constitution provided for presidential elections,
violent ascension to the position continued to be the rule.
This problem was resolved through cooperation between those
in power. An informal system of imposition was agreed upon,
wherein all appearances of open elections were maintained,
except for one matter: the victor was always guarenteed,
through deceit and coercion, to be the chosen candidate of
the elite. Even with this facade of participatory
government, the harsh repressive rule of the
Melendez-Quinonez family dynasty from 1912-1927, could not
be mistaken for anything other than dictatorships.
During this period, the economy of El Salvador was being
engineered as an almost exclusively agricultral export
system. This was because, around 1850, the volcanic slopes
of the country were found to be ideal for coffee
cultivation. The success of this capitalist venture proved
so profitable that pressure developed to convert additional
lands to its growth. Traditional communal lands that had
been used to grow subsistence crops were expropriated and
passed into the hands of the small elite minority. Coffee
exports grew to become 86. 9% of the total value of all
exports (an increase greater than 1100%) from 1880 to 1914.
The foreign exchange earned from these exports provided over
half (58.7%) of the government revenue. The opposite effect
was that by 1930, only 8.2% of those engaged in agriculture
were proprietors. 8 By 1971, only 5.2% owned the minimum land
required to support an average peasant family. 9 The seasonal
7 Langer, William L.; An Encyclopedia of World History,
5th Ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970.
8 Baloyra, Enrique A., El Salvador in Transition
,University of North Carolina Press , !98~2, ~p~. 6~:
9 Jung, Harald- "Class Struggle and Civil War in El
Salvador
,
in El Salvador : Central America in the New Cold
War
,
Gettleman, Lucef leld, Menashe, Mermlesfein, RudoslTT-
eds
.
, New York:Grove Press, Inc., 1981.
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labor requirements of coffee, and the capital intensive
nature of the second largest export, cotton (labor
requirements of which were greatly reduced by technological
advances), meant that a large and growing number of landless
peasants were either under- employed or unemployed.
Suppression of labor mobilization was acheived up to
this time by manipulation and intimidation. Local
paramilitary groups (guardia) were maintained by the large
landholders to protect their priveleges. In 1917, the first
alleged popular organization in the country was formed, the
Red League. It purported to represent a socialist program
for the peasants' benefit. In reality, it was an elite
sponsored organization designed to disrupt popular
collective action and control disorders. Several genuine
popular organizations did manage to form in the twenties,
such as the Regional Rederation of Salvadoran Workers
(FRTS), and the more radical Salvadoran Communist Party
(PCS), Red Aid International (SPI), and Anti-Imperialist
League. By May 1930, organization had become so effective
as to mass a demonstration of 80,000 workers in San Salvador
in demand for minimum pay and guarentees. All of these
groups had been largely organized and influenced by student
militants from El Salvador and other regional countries.
Many were avowed Marxists, all were inspired by the
successful Mexican Revolution. l °
The rapid degeneration of the economy, starting in 1928
with the fall in coffee prices, fell heaviest on the lower
class, greatly increasing unrest. The president at the
time, Pio Romero Bosque, had oscillated between minor labor
concessions and repression of dissent. After his initial
(s)election to the presidency by the Melendez-Quinonez clan,
1
"Anderson, Thomas P. , Matanza : El Salvador ' s Communist
Revolt of 1932
,
University of Nebraska Press , 1971
, pp.
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his first action had been to dissassociate himself from
them, and move toward political reform. The surprising
escalation in disorder this allowed compelled him to exert
stricter measures. Then, at the end of his term, Romero
Basque made an even greater break with tradition by opening
the selection for his successor to truly free elections.
Reflecting the high level of public politicization at the
time, Arturo Araujo, the liberal elite candidate of the just
formed Labor Party, was elected March 1931.
In what has become a very familiar theme in El Salvador,
Araujo took office in a tense atmosphere of dissatisfaction,
having to attempt to placate the opposite interests of the
elite and peasants and appease the military, all against the
additional challanges of economic depression and a growing
militant left. The heightened expectations of popular
classes, fomented by the radical organizations, demanded
immediate change; the elite refused to cooperate with the
new government; and Labor Party officials proved to be self
serving and inneffectual in government posts. Finally, the
threat of a socialist government and uncontrolled disorder,
coupled with the fact their pay was several months in
arrears, the army overthrew Araujo on 2 December 1931.
General Maximiliano Martinez was installed as president. 11
Martinez dealt with continued civil unrest with violent
repression. Legislative elections held the following
January proved the system to have reverted to the former
practices of electioneering, and closed the door on any
hopes for peaceful change. In response, the leading
Salvadoran Communist, Farabundo Marti, planned and organized
an armed revolt, intending to coordinate the frustrated
rural peasants with the equally dissatisfied urban workers,
students and soldiers. However, Marti was arrested and the
lx Baloyra, pp. 8-10
12
military conspirators revealed just, days before the
scheduled uprising. The PCS attempted to "call off" the
revolution, but word did not reach or convince the rural
western coffee growing region. An uncoordinated series of
mob violence in several towns resulted, killing
approximately 35 town officials. The rebels were easily put
down by the military. Retribution by both officials and
civilians was swift and brutal: an estimated 10,000
suspected insurgents were killed, many based on such
arbitrary justifications as appearance. 12
With the exception of one brief interim president,
General Martinez served as president until 1944. Addressing
the economic problems, Martinez established the Central
Reserve Bank to control currency, decreed a moratorium on
collection of debts and reduced interest rates to prevent
farm foreclosures, established the Salvadoran Coffee Company
as a source of credit and exporter, and restricted
capitalization of manufacturing enterprises to protect local
artisans. Although increasing government involvement in the
economy somewhat, these measures actually served to protect





After his regime managed to survive a coup attempt in
April of 1944, a general strike one month later in San
Salvador sponsored by frustrated bankers, entreprenuers
,
commercial employees, students and professionals, forced
Martinez to resign. General Andres Menendez was posted as
interim president, and immediately proceeded to promote
democratic initiatives: freedom of the press, labor
organizations, and a call for free elections. Conservative
12 Anderson, Matanza, pp. 134-6
13 Baloyra, pp. 12-13; and Webre, Stephen Jose Napolean
Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in salvadoran
Politics , 19TT0- 1972 . Baton Rouge and London, Louisiana
State University Press, 1979, pp. 10-11.
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forces, however, were not prepared to allow this progression
once again. Menendez was overthrown by a military coup in
October.
Colonel Osmin Aguirre, former director of the national
police and leading figure of the Matanza in 1932, was made
the next president. The proposed elections were carried
out, but once again the. proceedures had returned to close
government control to guarentee the outcome. General
Salvador Castaneda Castro was (s)elected. When the new
president attempted to extend his term past that
constitutionally allowed, he was in turn overthrown by the
"majors coup" of 14 December 1948.
Self proclaimed as the revolution of the "military
youth, the junta that was formed, incorporating military
officers from the academy administration, and two civilian
professionals, promised political democracy as well as
social and economic reform. Elections held in 1950
installed Colonel Oscar Osorio, leading member of the junta
and the official party candidate, as president
.
l u The
Constituent Assembly elected simultaneously drafted a social
democratic constitution, increasing the responsibilities of
the state. This regime continued the intent of the
preceding Revolutionary Council (junta) , by promoting
industrial development and urban social reforms. For
instance, a social security system was established, and
urban labor was allowed to organize. No reforms of the
rural agrarian structure were attempted, however. 15
Initiation of the socialist experiment in neighboring
Guatemala encouraged Osorio to harden his policies to
maintain control.
Osorio had stepped down from the junta just prior to
the elections and formed the Revolutionary Party or
Democratic Unification (PRUD).
15 Webre, pp. 16-17
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The election of 1956 saw Osorio's chosen successor, Jose
Maria Lemus , elected with the help of government
intervention. Several contending candidates, including two
fellow officers, had been disqualified. Government
influence over the media was pronounced. Conservatives were
apprehensive over Lemus ' s socially liberal tendencies.
Events in Cuba, inciting greater agitation in the
universities, and falling world commodities prices forced
the president to harden his policies. Just months before
the scheduled elections in 1961, Lemus attempted to gain
popular support through a series of reforms. These
relatively innoccuous reforms were again directed entirely
toward urban improvements. The only mass support the
administration was able to muster was by trucking
cooperative peasants into the capital for a rally.
These actions were not enough to satisfy the aroused
student and teacher groups. Increasing university
demonstrations led to increased government arrests and
violence. A state of seige was declared in September 1960.
Never having enjoyed the complete confidence of all
officers, the deteriorating situation convinced many that
the president was losing control. On 26 October, Lemus was
overthrown by a reformist military coup in attempt to
address the underlying social problems. Inclusion of three
civilian professionals with ties to the universities, and
promises for free elections, led to increasing popular
political activity and conservative apprehension. Two days
after a congress composed of predominantly moderate to
progressive political parties convened to rewrite the
electoral laws, another coup replaced the governing junta.
The new regime's rationale for acting was to quell the
disturbances generated by the "junta having allowed
15
extremist forces to run wild in the country." 16 Although
reactionary in its political control, the new
Civilian-Military Directorate continued moving toward
economic modernization. Economic diversity was promoted
with aid from the Alliance For Progress. The Central
Reserve Bank was nationalized for greater control over
monetary policy.
The Directorate formed a new official party, National
Conciliation Party (PCN) , to support its programs and
presidential candidate, Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera.
Legislative elections were immediately announced to be held
two months later in December 1961. The poorly organized
opposition parties were unprepared for the sudden
announcement. The three most signifigant legal parties,
Christian Democrats (PDC), Social Democrats (PSD), and the
Renovating Action Party (PAR), joined together to form the
Union of Democratic Parties (UPD) to attempt a united
oppositon front. The divergent interests of the parties,
however, prevented any coordinated campaign. This, combined
with the PCN's ability to utilize government resources and
campaign on reforms of the Directorate, resulted in the PCN
easily winning in the assembly. The newly elected
legislature then re-enacted the constitution of 1950 with
few changes. Presidential elections were scheduled for
April 1962.
These elections were marred by the total distrust of the
electoral process by virtually the entire country. No
opposition parties entered a candidate. Rivera and his
vice-president, who was related to the oligarchy by marriage
and had close ties to the U.S. administration, were elected.
After such an acrimonious beginning, Rivera was able to gain
legitimacy by easing electoral statutes to allow opposition
ie Baloyra, pp. 40-42
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parties to win signifigant gains. Favorable commodity
prices and the success of the Central American Common Market
in promoting industrial development in El Salvador,
generated considerable optimism within the population.
Rivera's committment to ant i- communism and gradual
democratization within a capitalist framework, won United
States approval and support. Liberalization of the
political process provided the avenue for the middle class
to express dissent and gain access to decision making.
Improvements in the quality of life, such as housing and
school projects, electrification, and minimum rural wages,
appealed to the masses. By limiting such reforms to
superficial measures which did not effect the social
foundations or were easily obviated by the oligarchy, Rivera
maintained a working relationship with the elite.
The legislative and mayoral elections of 1964
signifigant ly restored confidence in the system and promoted
the PDC to the dominant position fo opposition parties. In
response to PDC demands, Rivera had changed the majority
representation system for assembly elections, to one of
proportional representation. As a result, The PDC won 14
seats. They also won 37 municipalities, including Jose
Napolean Duarte's election as mayor of San Salvador. With
the exception of a few violations, the campaign and
elections were free and open. The military was ordered to
remain apolitical, and the government accepted the results.
Channeling discontent and violence into peaceful electoral
methods while still guarenteeing a non- socialist
ant i- communist (military) president, satisfied the great
majority of officers.
The presidential election of 1967 was a test of Rivera's
democratization. The PAR, the oldest party in existence at
the time, having been formed in oppositon to Martinez in
1944, now consisted of liberal democratic elites and
17
professionals. The differing economic viewpoints of these
two internal factions caused a split into the "old Guard"
Popular Salvadoran Party (PPS), which advocated a return to
laissez faire capitalism under civilian rule, and the
lefitist faction continuing under the PAR banner, but
espousing socialism, agrarian reform, and closer ties with
Cuba. Even though the new PAR's candidate was not a serious
threat to win, the PCN succeeded in centralizing attention
during the campaign on the issue of Communist influence in
the PAR. Other issues of substance were lost in the
psychosis of the red threat. Fidel Sanchez, the PCN
candidate, easisly won the election. The system had once
again operated democratically - the PAR was not declared
illegal until after the election.
President Sanchez Hernandez did not enjoy the positive
growth and relative stability of Rivera. The commodity
market suffered again, and rising deficits discouraged
private inveatments. Popular unrest grew as unemployment
and conditions worsened. Conservative elites were growing
uneasy over the continuing gains of the PDC in the
legislature and departments, having won 19 seats and 78
mayoralities in the 1968 elections. Conflict with Honduras,
at first causing greater dissent, proved to be the
administration's salvation, albeit temporary. After several
border incidents, increasing reports of Honduran
mistreatment of Salvadoran emigres, and rising nationalist
emotions, the country became united in support of invasion
of Honduras on 14 July 1969. The oppostion parties, led by
Duarte, joined with the government to form the National
Unity Front in support of national dignity and human rights.
The short four day war incurred relatively light
damages. The real losses to El Salvador were; the highly
favorable trade with Honduras ($23 million in 1968), land
access to Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and the closing of the
18
Honduran border to excess Salvadoran rural labor. The
return of thousands of refugee peasants to an already over
crowded, land controlled country posed an immediate problem
to the government. For the first time, the issue of
agrarian reform became a seriously considered and openly
debated matter. The legislative assembly organized a
Naional Agrarian Reform Congress that invited all sectors of
society to participate. This congress reached consensus on
a series of signifigant resolutions: the large and medium
agri-bussiness farms were the root of social problems; it
was the duty of the state to expropriate lands to remedy
root social ills; peasant and rural labor must be allowed to
organize to guarentee the success of reform. 17
Able to ride the wave of nationalism still cresting from
the war, the PCN managed to dominate the 1970 elections.
For the presidential elections of 1972, however, the regime
was forced to revert to more time tested methods to ensure
continued control of the system. Three oppostion parties
joined together to form the National Opposing Union (UNO) to
confront the PCN. These parties were the PDC , The National
Revolutionary Movement (MNR) , and the Democratic National
Union (UDN) . The MNR was founded in 1965 by Guillermo
Manuel Ungo , son of one of the PDC founders. They were
proponents of a "highly intellectualized democratic
socialism whose adherents valued ideological purity over
broad political appeal." 18 The UDN was a left splinter of
the official party, composed of dissatisfied liberal elites
and young officers. There were alleged ties with the
outlawed PCS. The PPS was now the representative party for
industrialists and comercial interests. With increasing
threats of government supported land reforms, discontented
17 Webre, pp. 120-129
18 Webre, pp. 102.
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landowners sought more suitable representation. They turned
to the United Independent Democratic Front, and its
originator and candidate General Jose Alberto "Chele"
Medrano . Medrano was the founder of rural peasant
paramilitary Nationalist Democratic organization (ORDEN)
,
hero of the Honduran war, and avowed Communist hater.
The course of events during elections and immediately
following, destroyed any semblance of an open democratic
system. When the early lead enjoyed by the PCN began to
fade with the tabulation of urban districts, traditional PDC
and leftist party strongholds, the government terminated
reports of returns. The following day, official results
declared the PCN candidate, Arturo Armando Molina, the
winner. Conditions deteriorated rapidly: political
violence took a sudden upturn; radical leftists initiated a
series of terrorist attacks; and, the UNO was organizing
mass protests over the election. Legislative elections held
the following March confirmed the determination of the
regime to maintain control. The UNO slate in San Salvador,
their strongest area, was disqualified. The party therefore
conducted a campaign to invalidate the voting there by
instructing supporters to cast null votes. (If a majority
of votes are nullified by defacing or casting blank ballots,
then the district vote is voided and must be re- conducted)
.
After the success of this tactic was overruled by the
government controlled Central Electoral Council (CCE), civil
unrest reached new levels. Two days later, a military coup
was attempted in the capital.
The leaders of the coup were not politically supported
and were relatively unknown. However, after half a day of
fighting, an UNO leader and Duarte both made radio
announcements advocating popular support for the rebellion.
The army rebels were outnumbered and outgunned by loyalist
forces, though, and by late afternoon the uprisisng had been
20
defeated. President Sanchez announced his intentions of
executing the leaders, including Duarte who had been
captured in the Venezuelan First Secretary's home. After
considerable diplomatic pressure, Duarte was flown into
exile. Whether he had been a leader of the revolt or not,
which is highly unlikely, is immaterial. What was important
was that the political liberalism initiated by Rivera had
succeeded in arousing a large sector of the population. The
events of 1972-73 removed the more productive and less
violent electoral option. The moderate centrists and
leftists were left searching for other avenues of
expression.
The remainder of the seventies saw the growth of social
organizations in the form of student, peasant and worker
groups resorting to civil disobedience. Formerly
conservative religious leaders became more militantly vocal
in denouncing government repression and social conditions.
The more radical leftists resorted to increased terrorist
tactics, and found growing support. Conservatives reacted
by hardening the defense of their interests through
political suasion of government, and direct attacks on
representative examples of those responsible for the
destabilization. Government response was to attempt to
control the situation and instill order by breaking up
demonstrations, closing the National univerity, and making
sweeping arrests of subversives. To the dismay of
conservatives, Molina also attempted to continue the PCN
programs of gradual social reform. Particularly infuriating
was the nationalization of the railroad, raising minimum
wages, and passage of an agrarian reform program.
The fate of Molina's agrarian transformation signaled
the trend in the regime. This program had created the
Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation (ISTA) to
administer the expropriation of unproductive lands for
21
peasant control. The fierce resistance put up by landowners
was succesful in forcing Molina to compromise his efforts
and render the program ineffectual. This process was
followed by the election of General Carlos Humberto Romero
as president in 1977. Romero was known for his disdain for
land reform and his hardline methods for dealing with
dissent. The blatantly rigged elections led to mass
demonstrations by UNO supporters in San Salvador. In
response, Molina ordered the army to disperse the
protestors; over twenty deaths resulted. Romero justified
the action by saying:
When we saw that the country could fall into social and
economic chaos, we decided to move against the
subversives, but we did so always respecting the
principle of human rights. 19
Molina the weak before had rejected all U.S. military aid in
response to the Carter administrations human rights stand.
Increasing violence further radicalized both ends of the
extremes, and brought the situation to international
attention. Paramilitary groups, such as the FALANGE and
White Warriors Union (UGB), promised to exterminate all
Communists and their allies. After the kidnap and murder of
a- prstigious member of the oligarchy, Mauricio Borgonovo, by
a guerrilla group, the UGB threatened to kill all Jesuit
priests in El Salvador, whom they blamed for instilling
Marxist-Leninist teachings in the otherwise passive
peasentry. Direct pressure from the U.S. resulted in Romero
guarenteeing protection of the priests, and allowing
international groups to investigate human rights conditions.
The Romero government became known as "one of the world's
worst violators of human rights." 20 However, kidnappings,
19 New York Times, 20 March, 1977
20 Baloyra, p. 65.
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bombings and attacks by the radical left and the reactionary
responses from the "death squads", continued to increase.
Shortly after the Nicaraguan revolution, Romero
attempted to moderate popular tensions by promising free
elections the following year. Previously he had attempted
to quell unrest by lifting his Public Order Law, enacted a
year earlier to officially repress dissent, and organize a
national forum for dialogue to conduct open discussions on
the problems. All three measures were inadequate for the
situation, and held no confidence in any sector. The
regime's legitimacy was eroded. On 15 October 1979, Romero
was overthrown by a military coup led by junior reformist
officers. The newly formed junta promised to establish law
and order, secure human rights, and develop a democratic
system to carry out social and economic reforms to provide
more equitable distributions. The junta was composed of two
officers (Colonels Arnoldo Maj ano and Abdul Gutierrez), and
three civilians (Ungo , Roman Mayorga, president of Central
American University, and Mario Antonio Andino , an
industrialist )
.
Immediate attempts were made to institute programs to
acheive the stated goals. ORDEN was decreed illegal, and a
special investigative commission was organized to determine
the status of the many missing political prisoners. All
landholdings over 247 acres were frozen until new statutes
could be made. Control of the export trade was nationalized
under the National Institute of Coffee (INCAFE). Effective
implementation of these measures proved to be no easier than
those in the past. Control of security forces, let alone
paramilitary "private" armies, was not in the hands of the
moderate junta. Violent repression of dissent continued.
Progress in determing the cases of dissappeared persons was
hampered by obstruction and intimidation of the
investigators. Out of frustration, the moderate civilians
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in the government demanded the military commit itself to the
professed goals of the "revolution" by relinquishing
leadership to the junta, removing private sector
representation from the government, and opening dialogue
between the military, government and popular organizations.
Unable or unwilling to meet these demands, led to the
resignation of 22 members of government.
Duarte, having returned from exile and reassumed
leadership in the PDC , announced the "willingness (of the
PDC) to participate in the government, providing the
leadership of the armed forces is restructured, dialogue
with popular organizations is opened, and the private sector
is excluded from the government." 21 A second junta was
formed on 10 January, with PDC members Hector Dada, and Jose
Antonio Morales Erhlich, and independent Dr. Jose Avalos
joining the two military officers. Two of the three demands
having been met with the private sector not being
represented, and the need for dialogue with popular groups
officially announced as part of the process of government
transition.
The PDC was no more succesful in controlling the
lawlessness. A large mass demonstration in San Salvador led
by three of the largest popular organizations was fired upon
by National Police, killing 24. One month later, Attorney
General Mario Zamora was assassinated by right wing
terrorists. The very next month, Archbishop Arnulfo Romero,
the most respected supporter of peasant rights and critic of
violence, was murdered while conducting mass. Then during
his funeral, Army units fired on a crowd of 80,000 mourners.
Hector Dada resigned from the junta, and was replaced by
Duarte
.
21 Miami Herald, 5 January, 1980
24
Efforts for reform, though, continued: banks were
nationalized to control lending practices; the ISTA was
reconstituted to carry out newly decreed statutes for
Agrarian reform. Predictably, these were met with
obstructionist tactics by conservatives, but the resort to
violent methods increased. Attacks were made on ISTA
officials and intended peasant recipients. It was estimated
that approximately 1600 persons were killed in the first
four months of 1980, more than during the entire term of
Romero. 22 Atrocities reached their nadir when six leaders of
the newly formed Democratic Revolutionary Front, the
political umbrella organization for leftist coordination,
were abducted and killed, followed just two weeks later by
the abduction and murder of three U.S. Maryknoll sisters and
one layworker by National Guard troops.
During this period, there was a shift within the junta;
Colonel Maj ano , original leader chosen by the "juventud
militar", was first removed from military command, and then
from the junta entirely. Duarte was • then made president,
with Col. Gutierrez as vice-president. This fourth junta
managed to survive the guerilla's "Final Offensive" in early
1981, two attempted rightwing coups, and continued
increasing political violence. It was announced at the end
of 1981 that legislative elections would be held in March of
1982.
Under the close scrutiny of international observers and
press corps, these elections were considered open and fair.
Although the campaign had been marred by attempts violent
intimidation, and the guerrillas utilized obstructionist
tacticsof their own to attempt to disrupt the process.
There were six parties running tickets, however the choice
was basically one between the PDC platform, and that of the
22 Miami Herald, 8 May, 1980
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newly formed, hardline ant i- Communis t , rightist Nationalist
Republican Alliance (ARENA). The old line official party,
the PCN, had lost considerable support in the polarizatin of
the situation. The majority of leftist groups refused to
participate, claiming the elections would be fraudulent and
their participation would invite violent retribution. The
final results were that the PDC received an overall majority
of votes and seats (24). Faced with a preponderance of more
conservative parties, however, the end result was that the
right formed a coalition to maintain an effective voting
majority
.
Following this outcome, the assembly drafted a new
constitution and installed Alvaro Magana as provisional
president until elections could be held in 1984. ARENA
deputies attempted to make good on campaign promises by
rolling back reforms previously instituted, yet
signif igant ly , they were not entirely succesful. Agrarian
land redistribution was institutionalized in the
constitution by a compromise- program hammered out by an
inter-party commission. The reactionary right's most
effective tool continued to be violent intimidation.
Presidential elections were held 25 March 1984. Once
again the choice lay between Duarte and the PDC ' s gradualist
reform platform, and ARENA'S candidate, Roberto D'Aubuisson,
who promised a return to law and order and the golden years
of the past. No candidate having received a majority in the
first round, a runoff was held between the two leaders.
Duarte came out the winner with 54% of the vote. Once again
the elections were closely monitored; yet D'Aubuisson
attempted to have the results annulled, charging fraud, but
it was unsuccessful. It was just seven months later, on the
anniversary of the 1979 coup, Duarte made his startling
announcement at the U.N. to open talks with the rebel
forces. Two years later in March 1984, against all
26
predictions, Duarte's PDC won a clear majority of seats in
the legislature.
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III. INTERESTS , VALUES & PERCEPTIONS
The conflict in El Salvador has centered on access to
and control of governmental decision making regarding social
and economic policy and the distribution of rewards. The
parties competing for these interests can be discribed as
consisting of three general catagories, each a distinctive
Salvadoran definition: conservatives; progressives; and
revolutionaries. 23 In describing the main participants, this
catagorization of society has a definate socio-economic
deliniation. However, it must be said that each group has
attracted a blend from each social strata in varying
degrees .
A. VIEW FROM THE RIGHT
The first group is the conservative faction, whose
fundamental make-up consists of two major value systems:
1. Traditionalists, whose values of the Hispanic,
Catholic heritage instill a preference for rigid
adherence to centralized authority. Church and
government are interrelated, with the Church
providing the moral justification for official
policy, and government allowing full support and
authority for the Church within its realm.
Dissidants and nonconformers to the regime attack
both church and state; the culprits are easily
condemned as infidels. Retribution is swift and
just
.
University Press, 1979. pp. x-xii
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2. Liberals, so named for their belief in the classical
laissez-faire doctrine of non-state intervention in
the economy, and their professed democratic leanings
with regard to freedom of speech, law and the
separation of church and state. However, when this
group's priveleged interests are threatened by
economic crises or attempted changes , the cry for
protection of their "economic liberty" demands
government action.
It has been the liberal beliefs which have predominated
in the economic and political functionings in El Salvador.
However, whenever the sacred order has been threatened, the
hard line traditional response has been accepted as most
effective to ensure control. The common bond that ties the
conservatives together is their belief in the tenuous
balance of social order which is constantly threatened by
numerous internationalist agents. Social and economic
reform is not only undesirable, but incompatible with
stability. In realist terms, these students of social
Darwinism believe in the right of the strong in exploiting
the weak.
Formation of conservative interests and values has its
deepest roots in the Spanish colonial heritage. Bequethed
with the legacy of the conquistador ambition to gain
"spiritual freedom" through personal dominion, the early
Salvadoran elite inherited the psychological attitude of
superiority by virture of wealth and power. The Spanish
conquerors believed law was determined by the possessor of
the greatest strength and will to command it. 24 Specific
ideals emanating from this can be seen in the attraction of
the traditionalists to centralized authority; the distinct
2u Vivas, Enrique; "Spanish Heritage", Conflict and
Violence in Latin American Politics, Moreno & Mi tram, eds .




class structure defined not along ethnic lines or even
wealth, but a certain attitude; and, the immediate resort to
violence to supress disorder.
The small group of landed elite who secured control of
the country following independence from Spain produced the
legend of the "14 Families". This group comprised the early-
oligarchy which suceeded in manipulating market forces to
gain greater economic and social prominence and,
consequently, political power. In what has been described
as the "magic square of oligarchic domination", 25 they were
able to exercise complete control over agricultural
production, land tenure, export, and finance. Having
control of official government policy allowed them to
increase concentration of lands through sanctioned
expropriations of communal farm lands, (for the good of the
"national" export economy), which deepened the subjugation
of rural labor. Increasing numbers of landless peasants
were no longer self sufficient but reliant on seasonal
employment on the large estates (fincas). This large and
growing rural labor force guarenteed minimal costs in terms
of wages, as long as the campesinos could be kept from
collective political activism.
Diversification of the wealthy elite into the finance
and export sectors guarenteed control of all facets of the
primary source of state revenue. Favorable tax legislation
levied tariffs on imports which were paid for with foreign
exchange earned by the export market. Exports were not
taxed. Dependence on world commodity markets for revenue
left little incentive for investing earnings in developing a
domestic market. Those who needed manufactured goods (those
with money) imported them. This ability to disregard
25 Baloyra, Enrique A. El Salvador in Transition .
Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press,
1982, pp. 10-28 J
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internal demands allowed the agribussiness economy to
operate independent from and with little regard for social
development. 26 Maintenance of the rigid class structure and
economic conditions were justified as neccessary for the
continued prosperity of the country. Any changes to the
operation of the agri-export sector, such as dangerous
reforms, could upset the delicate balance of such a small
country with a rapidly growing population. By "manipulating
the ideological symbols that it monopolized", 27 sanctity of
private property, free enterprise, and democracy, the
oligarchy was able to inculcate the belief that economic
survival of the nation was directly tied to survival of the
exclusionary agricultural export system.
The post World War II indutrialization and modernization
period in El Salvador gave birth to a new faction within the
conservative clan; the bourgeoisie. The "progressive"
military presidential regimes, initiated in 1948, succeeded
in promoting economic diversity from agriculture by
developing industrial infrastructure needed- to attract
investment; for example, the port works built at Acajutla;
the massive Lempa River hydroelectric project; and
improvement in transportation. All of the instituted
programs benefited urban commercial and industrial
capitalists; those who had or could gain access to
financing. It can be argued that concentration of
manufacturing into the hands of few occurred, having emerged
from a base of concentrated agricultural capital; required
funding for the modernization programs had to come from the
agri-export sector. It was neccessary, therefore, for the
emerging industrial sector to accept and promote a mutual
2 6 Torres-Rivas , Edelberto. "The Central American Model
of Growth: Crisis for Whom?", in Revolution in Central
America Stanford Central America Action Network", eds
.
boulder: Westview Press, 1983.
27 Baloyra, p. 21.
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interest in protecting the established "coffee economy".
Reform of the agribussiness structure was not attempted. As
long as this sector of society held control of means of
revenue and finance ("finance originat (ing) in the surplus
generated by agricultural exports", and the eight largest
banks linked either directly by ownership or through
"official interests"), 28 the industrial/ commercial interests
were in a dependency and therefor secondary status.
International investment provided an avenue for the
industrializing faction to gain economic freedom from the
agricultural oligarchy, and consequently more political
influence. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America initiated the process by designing a regional
integration scheme to increase internal markets throughout
Central America: the Central American Common Market. With
fincancing from the U.N., U.S., and the Inter-American
Development Bank, projects were completed in each of the
region's countrys to promote industrial development.
Manufacturing's contribution to the gross domestic product
rose 30% in El Salvador during the 1960s. 29 This shifting
internal balance of power is best seen in the vehicles and
methodsused to promote conservative interests.
Articulation of conservative interests has been
predominantly conducted through agricultural and bussiness
associations. Two of the most notable examples of these
have been the National Association of Private Enterprise
(ANEP), and Eastern Region Agrarian Front (FARO). ANEP
became the most influential interest group of the 1970 's by




29 Wynia, Gary. "Setting the Stage for Rebellion:
Economics and Politics in Central America's Past", in Rift
and Revo lution : the Central American Imbroglio . Howard J
.
Wiarda, Ed. Washington and London: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Research
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agriculture; the cafeteleros (coffee producers), and other
agricultural associations, and Chambers of Commerce. Its
policy and proceedures reflected a compromise between the
traditional and liberal camps, as well as between the
agriculture and industry factions inevitable within such an
heterogeneous socio-economic group. The internal balance of
power between the agricultural and industrial interests took
a definate shift toward the modernizing side from the late
70* s on. In the 1976 reaction to President Molina's
attempted Agrarian Transformation, Anep was an outspoken
critic and leader of public demonstrations to block the
program. ( (REF NYT)) The focal interest point rallied
around was the protection of private sector freedom; land
reform represented blatant government intervention in the
market and a violation of the rights of private property.
The basic tactic employed was a massive public campaign
through the media (predominantly controlled by
conservatives), and rallies to discredit the government
programs as inefficient and counter productive, and to
promote those of private enterprise as the traditional
system that has been so successful.
In May 1980, ANEP joined the newly formed Productive
Alliance (AP), which incorporated several more
entreprenurial bussiness associations. (Salvadoran
Industrialists' Association (ASI), Nationsl Federation of
Small Enterprises (FENAPES), Society of Salvadoran Merchants
& Industrialists, and the Union of Salvadoran Entreprenurial
Leaders (UDES), for example). These groups banded together
in protest of the second junta's refusal to include private
sector representatives in the government, one of the demands
the Christian Democrats made prior to their agreeing to join
the junta. ( (MH 5JAN80; Bal pl44)) The AP basically
continued ANEP ' s program, however, the controlling interests
became those in industry and commerce. Their greatest fear
33
of government reform in agriculture spilling over into
nationalization of banks and exports having been realized,
their attitude became even more obstructionist.
FARO Was organized during the 1976 agrarian crisis by
the traditional planters and cattlemen. The most logical
reason for their need to form a separate association was
that they were not satisfied with the influence they had in
ANEP . FARO tactics combined the public arousal methods in
conjunction with ANEP, but they also took obstruction one
step further by focusing on the cane-roots level.
Landowners were instructed on tactics to delay property
seizures through intimidation and violence. Workers were
threatened with unemployment for complicancy, and owners
vowed to fight rather than turn over their land. The
Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS), a rural peasant
organization promoting land reform, was convinced not to
support the program. As one UCS official put it, "We no
longer believe in the land reform legislation." 30
Electorally, the majority of conservatives had been
satisfied with exerting influence on the military's choice
of candidates for the official party, National Conciliation
Pary (PCN). Fringe parties were occasionally formed
promoting candidates representing specific interests, such
as the traditional conservative United Independant
Democratic Front of General Jose Alberto Medrano , of 1972.
The bussiness interests were attracted to the official party
because it provided the modernizing approach which benefited
industry, without threatening more radical reforms which
would entail government intervention. With the intenese
polarization of the junta years, the official party lost
support of many conservatives, agricultural and bussiness.
The military's acceptance of land redistribution and
30 Miami Herald, 12 November, 1977
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nationalization of private enterprises drew strong support
to the National Republican Alliance (ARENA), formed in 1981
in anticipation of constituent assembly elections. Roberto
D'Aubuisson was chosen leader of the party. D'Aubuisson was
a former major, dismissed after the 1979 coup, known to have
conspired to overthrow the government in 1980 and 1981,
strongly suspected of complicency in the murder of
Archbishop Romero with direct links to death squads. 31
ARENA'S platform was honest and direct: reforms made in the
past two years by the junta have brought the economy down,
and should therefor be rolled back; Christian Democratic
policies of reform are equivilent to Communism, (always
supported by his watermelon allegory: green on the outside
(PDC color) and red on the inside); the guerilla war can be
ended in three months by exterminating the rebels.
B. REVOLUTIONARIES
Diametrically opposed to the conservatives ore those who
believe reform of the existing system is vital and can only
be accomplished through the radical alteration of present
power structures. Leaders of this group in El Salvador
emerged from middle class student political discussion
groups ascribing to Marxist-Leninist principles. Although
outlawed since 1932, the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS)
has continued in existence since the 1920s. After the
devastation of the Matanza, party strategy had been to
organize labor unions and work through the system by forming
coalitions with reformist groups in order to acheive
socialist gains.
In 1970, the more militant party members, led by the
secretary general, Salvador Cayetano Carpio , split from the
PCS to form the armed guerrilla group Popular Forces of
31 New York Times, 16 February, 1982.
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Liberation (FPL) . FPL strategy was for a prolonged
"people's war, based on the foco theory of Che Guevara.
Adherence to this strategy casued two signifigant episodes
of internal dissension. The more recent, in late 1982,
culminated in the assassination of the leading opponent of
the strategy, ordered by Cayetano Carpio, who shortly
afterward committed suicide.
The first internal dissagreement over strategy led to
the formation of the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP).
Composed of radical Christian Democrats and "Maoist
university students", 32 who objected to the inadequacy of
the foco theory. An apparent inability to formulate a
consistent strategy or ideology within the ERP led to
another split, which was directly precipitated by the
assassination of the most notable proponent of political
struggle over military, Roque Dalton. The militarist types,
led by Ernesto Jovel, formed the Armed Forces of National
Restistance (FARN).
The failure of the first junta in 1980 was the final
blow to the PCS ' s attempts at bridge building with centrist
groups. They joined the armed struggle by forming the Armed
Forces of Liberation (FAL) . The only guerrilla group
smaller than the FAL is the Revolutionary Party of Central
American Workers (PRTC). The greater strength of both of
these groups lies in organization of dissatisfied workers
rather than warfare. As such, they have tended to favor
negotiations more than the other groups. 33
All of these guerrilla organizations were born in the
tremendous frustrations of the young idealistic middle
class, concentrated in the cities. Unlike the original
student activists, Farabundo Marti and his associates, these
32 New York Times, 18 March, 1982
33 ibid.
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groups in the early 1970s concentrated on the urban masses.
Their tactics were comprised of terrorist attacks directed
toward destabilizing the government and its security forces
.
The FPL became known as the "pisteleros" (gunmen) , for their
attacks on police posts, the ERP was called the "bomberos"
(bombers) for their bombings of official buildings, and the
FARN was referred to as "pisteros" (money- chasers ) for their
kidnappings for ransoms. The immediate result of these
acts, other than filling the FARN's warchest with
approximately $30 million, was to increase government
repression and reactionary violence.
Similar to the Communist efforts of the 20s, Jesuit
priests began mobilizing the rural peasants through their
desired goal of raising the consciousness of the campesinos
toward their right for a better life. 3 " Ministering the
"theology of liberation", teh reoriented Catholic Church
emphasized salvation through the elimination of hunger,
poverty, and despair. The approximation of goals between
the liberal clerics and Salvadoran Marxists of demanding
restitution to the poor by placing the means of production
in their hands, provided an avenue for cooperation between
the devout Catholic peasants and the guerrillas. It also
provided the rationalization for reactionary repression of
both the church and peasants. 3S
One of the first popular organization to surface was a
direct result of this religious awakening; the Salvadoran
Christian Peasants Federation (FECCAS) was formed in the
early 1960s. Organized by the Christian Democrats and the
Catholic Church, it was dedicated to promoting and
protecting peasant rights. Following the blatant electoral
fraud of 1972 and the violent supression of protest, FECCAS
3
"New York Times, 27 August, 1975.
35 Anderson, Thomas. "Roots of Revolution" in Rift and
Revolution
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joined with several trade unions, teachers and student
organizations to form the more militant Unified Popular
Action Front (FAPU) . The combined strategy was to form a
broad political front composed of democratic and reformist
groups from all sectors to pressure the regime into
providing economic and political liberties through both
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary tactics.
FECCAS became even more radicalized and split from FAPU
in 1975 to join a similar rural peasant group, Rural Workers
Union (UTC) , and other more radical urban trade unions and
teachers and student organizations in forming the Popular
Revolutionary Bloc (BRP). Publicly committed to a
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the BRP ' s stated goal is to
establish a socialist revolutionary government under
proletarian leadership. 36 Their tactics of strikes and
demonstrations are directed toward increasing wages,
lowering rents, land reform, and better urban working
conditions. Occupations of buildings and embassies are
designed to attract domestic and international attention to
the situation in the country. As a bloc leader, Julio
Flores, said,
We pick embassies where we expect collaberation and




Estimated at 60,000 active members, the BRP is the largest
revolutionary organization in El Salvador. While supporting
the guerrilla wholeheartedly, the bloc publicly
dissassociates itself from direct participation in the armed
struggle as that is not their role.
36 Jung, Harald, 'Class Struggle and Civil War in El
Salvador
,
in El Salvador : Central America in the New Cold
War
. Gettlemen, et ai. New York: urove Fress_Tnc~ 1981,
p . 78 .
37 New York Times, 13 May, 1979.
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A third popular revolutionary organization, the Popular
League-28 February (LP-28), was formed in early 1978 in
response to the massacre of student demonstrators following
Romero's election, (the date for which the group is named).
Its composition, ideology and strategy is similar to the
BRP , but it is the smalles of the organizations. It has
been suggested the LP-28 was formed by the ERP to perform as
its political vehicle and to moderate leftist criticism of
its militarist bent. 38
The growth of popular organizations and their effective
destabilization of the regime and the need of the guerrilla
groups to expand their mass support led to the closer
cooperation between certain organizations.
C. PROGRESSIVES: CENTER LANES OF THE POLITICAL HIGHWAY
Between the extremes of Conservative and Revolutionary
exists the broad catagory of Progressives, encompassing
moderates and centrists. Born out of the perception for the
need for a non- Communist , reformist alternative, this group
holds the common premise that change within the system is
neccessary for progress and can best be accomplished within
a capitalist framework, aided by active state participation.
The first appearance of such an interest was a result of the
general disenchantment with the Martinez regime in 1944,
growing social pressures, and the post-World War II wave of
democratic economic development that swept the region. This
was the modernizing faction within the military and private
sector, whose primary objective was economic diversity and
growth. They represented a new direction toward national
thought rather than purely personalistic . As such, attempts
at political modernization began as well, with the
38 Baloyra, p. 69.
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institution of democratic electoral processes, opening up
the system to wider participation.
Formation of the official party, PRUD, followed by the
PCN, represented these interests int the political arena
they had just created. It can be argued that this was an
attempt to emulate the Mexican single party system. 39
However, the track record indicates it was more a return to
the prior system of imp sicion, with the only difference
being that the military were the source for the presidential
succession. One definate fact made evident by the coup of
1961, and Molina's agrarian transformation crisis of 1976,
was that, prior to 1979 the system would allow only so much
political modernization.
The economic modernization produced the
socio-politically progressive middle class. Industrial and
commercial diversification after 1950 stimulated growth of
urban professionals, and medium and small bussinesses, among
others. This is relatively indicated in the growth of
numbers of urban "decisive economic actors", which increased
from 4000 to 24,000 from the thirties to the sixties," and
the number of non-agricultural, self-employed urbanites
which grew from 246,000 to 361,000 in the latter sixties,
early seventies.* 1 This expanding middle class combined with
widening political involvement led to the formation of
parties based on social democratic ideals and middle class
values. The most notable of these being the Christian
Democrats (PDC) , the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)
,
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The first two parties were both formed in 1960 out of
intellectual discussion groups composed of professionals,
students and teachers. The PDC derived their ideological
basis from the Roman Catholic social doctrine, refuting both
Marxist socialism and classic liberalism. Accurately
predicting social inequities would eventually lead to
violence, they called for a "revolution in liberty": a
gradual evolution toward classical democracy and
socio-economic justice. This would be accomplished by state
economic planning to reduce unemployment through
industrialization and increased productivity in all sectors.
Their stand on land reform was fairly conservative,
believing that private property is a basic right, except
when used in a manner detrimental to society. Therefor,
where neccessary, land redistribution should be effectively
planned for to optimize effecient use, and the owners justly
compensated. Basically, the PDC ' s objectives were to
develop a "large and comfortable middle class to provide the
backbone of a stable economy and durable democracy .... the
solutions to El Salvador's problems did not lie in pulling
down the oligarchy, but in elevating the oppressed.'"* 2
The MNR was a more "highly intellectualized democratic
socialism whose adherents valued ideological purity over
broad political appeal. '"* 3 Led by Guillermo Ungo , whose
father had been a founder of the PDC, their abstract program
managed to gain a small cadre of urban labor in addition to
the intellectuals. Both the MNR and UDN believed in much
greater state intervention; both stood for evolution to
socialism. The UDN appealed to laborers, sudents, teachers
and activists, including some disenchanted military
<,2 Webre, Stephen. Jose Napolean Duarte and the
Christian Democratic Party in Salvadoran Politics 1960-1972




officers. In addition, this party served as the conduit for
the illegal Communist Party's electoral involvement. Both
the UDN and the MNR were unable to acheive real electoral
success, except in coalition with the PDC , which they did
from 1972-77 as the National Opposition Union (UNO). From





The conflict in El Salvador has centered over the access
to and control of governmental decisison making.
Specifically, social and economic policy and distribution of
the rewards. The ability and degree to which a group can
successfully incorporate their designs into a competitive
system is a function of their bargaining power. Defined as
"political power held and exercised bilaterally",'*''
bargaining power is observable only in relation to and in
competition with another's. It is a complex function
derived from the interdependent qualities of inherent
bargaining power, actual abargaining power and bargaining
skill." 5
Inherent bargaining power is the ability to influence an
outcome based on one's own perceived values of gain or loss
from choosing to either stand firm or concede. In other
words, it is one's own conviction (inherent resolve) in
executing a certain action, based on the assessed value of
expected gains or losses, as compared to other alternatives.
For example, the perceived possibility for victory
,
with
its contingent costs, in going to war, relative to the
losses that would be accepted by conceding to demands. This
is the basis from which initial strategies are devised and
employed
.
""Snyder, Glenn and Diesing, Paul, Conflict Among





Actual bargaining power results from the perceived
inherent power of a competitor as compared to one's own. It
is the resulting relative power perceived after assessing
the determination (inherent resolve) of an opponent to make
good on his threats or promises, taking into consideration
one's own assessment of his perception of your resolve. The
crucial ingredients here are to be able to determine the
competitor's commitment to an interest, without
overestimating, while at the same time, communicating the
highest credible resolve on your part. This is where the
function of bargaining skill comes in, which can be
described as the ability to apply strategy and tactics in a
manner that produces the most favorable outcome. Strategy
may employ tactics ranging from accomodative - where a high
value is placed on reaching an agreement and therefore,
concessions are made - to coercive, resolute firmness and
deception, with no interest in reaching a compromise
agreement, total acceptance of demands is expected.
There are two other factors which can have a direct
influence on bargaining power. One is internal to an
interest group, and the other external. The first is
employs the concept of the "whole bargainer"; the extent to
which a group is able to project a unified, cohesive
character. The preferred interests of an heterogenous group
vary according to the internal power relationships between
members, just as it does between groups. It has been said
that "crisis bargaining is as much a struggle within as
without.'"* 6 Logically, a group that is unified in agreement
on interests, values and strategies, will convey the
greatest possible resolve, and therefore possess greater
bargaining power than if it were diverse and uncoordinated.
ibid.
, p . 75
.
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The external influence on bargaining is in terms of the
ability of a third party(s) to effect the outcome of a
conflict by altering "the resolve of the main protagonists."
For this effect to exist, there must be a signifigant sense
of dependence on the part of the protagonists toward the
external actor. Existence of alternate sources of external
support weaken this dependence and, therefore, detract from
the third party's effective influence." 7
1. Application to the Salvadoran Context
It has been said that, "in Central American
politics, recognition of the capability to exercise power is
the equivalent of 'legitimacy' in advanced democracy.'"48 In
El Salvador, the means for expressing power capabilities can
be broadly catagorized as the: control of means of violence
(institutional or non-institutional); control of economic
institutions; capacity to effectively organize and
manipulate mass consent; and the ability to mobilize
external support. Control of the political institution
itself has been omitted because, it is the possession of one
or more of the above that renders control and effective
application of government resources. Through the
demonstration of these capabilities, the participants have
defined the political condition of the country as it has
evolved
.
" 7 Clough, Michael, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe , in
Changing Realities in Southern Africa: Implications for
American Policy" Berkeley ; Institute of International
Studies , University of California 1982, pp. 2-3.
"'Anderson, Charles W. "Central American Political
Parties: A Functional Approach.", Western Political
Quarterly
, XV (1962), pp. 125-39.
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a. Control of Means of Violence
One theory holds that in Latim America, violence
is accepted as an integral part of the political culture,
perpetuated by non-political socialization structures
(familiy, Church, and less formally organized institutions),
and political traditions such as frequent display of
violence and government revision and replacement.'* 9 Whether
this theory applies directly to El Salvador would require an
indepth sociological study. It is evident from the
historical perspective, however, that violence has always
been a consistently used political tool.
Use of violence as the means for controlling the
political situation was adopted during the anarchic period
following independence. Armies were sent from Mexico in
1822, attemptin to force Central America's inclusion into
the newly formed Empire. Civil war between liberals and
conservatives finally destroyed the United Provinces of
Central America in 1840, but several more armed attempts at
confederation neccessitated a continual effort of self
defense. 50 Internal politics were typified by personal
conflicts between elite landowners. When order was
established near the turn of the century, by cooperation
amongst the elite in determining the government , the armies
organized and financed by these individuals could then turn
inward for internal security against an increasingly
restless population. An internal "national" security force
was established by 1895. The need for stability and
continuity encouraged the growth and professionalization
into what today is a complex military organization,
Kling, Merle; "Violence and Politics in Latin
America" , in Conflict and Violence in Latim American
Politics. Moreno J
.
, and Mitrani B
.
, eds . New Vork: Thomas
Y. Urowell Co. 1971.
50 Langer, William* Encyclopedia of World History
,
Eoston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972, p. 8~57~
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consisting of the army, for national defense, two internal
security forces, National Guard and National Police, and the
Treasury police for intelligence and investigation for
national policy enforcement. 51 Herein lies the institutional
control of violence.
This network of armed forces successfully
monopolized all control of violence until the last half of
the twentieth century, (including and because of the
crushing defeat of the abortive peasant revolt in 1932).
Competition in the form of "psuedo" or non-institutional
violence emerged with the birth of clandestine paramilitary
organizations such as ORDEN, FALANGE, and the UGB . Their
strategy is terrorism to intimidate specific target groups
into silencing their dissent, and convincing others of the
advisability of not bucking the system. Their tactics are
publicized threats and viscious murders.
The final form of violence as political power is
manifest by the insurgents now fighting the regime. Since
the goal of this group of power seekers is the removal of
institutional power capabilities now existing, violent
confrontation is the only means. As such, they "fight fire
with fire". Their tactics exist on two levels: terrorist
attacks of government buildings, economic infrastructure,
and officials; and, armed force attacks on government
forces. The former is designed to create disorder, incite
greater repressive reaction and discredit the regime. The
latter is to cause the same effects within the military with
the eventual result of weakening the will of soldiers and
the civilian population caught in the middle.
5l McDonald, Ronald; "Civil Military Relations in Central
America: The Dilemmas of Political Institutionalization", in
Rift and Revolution : The Centra l American Imbroglio .
WiradaT; Howard, ecTT American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research. Washington and London, 1984.
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b. Economic Institutions
In the general course of human nature, a power over a
man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. 52
More than just possessing wealth, this form of
power is acheived by controlling the means of production,
source of government revenue and expenditures, and
determinant of individual livelihood. The legend of the
"fourteen families" and the "magic suare of oligarchic
domination" previously discussed, is the prime example of
monopolization of all sources of economic power mentioned.
Control of the means of production can provide wealth
through maximization of profits, which in turn can be used
to "buy" political power held by another interest. At the
same time, it logically provides a form of suasion over
those employed. This is especially true if an ample supply
of alternate labor exists as a constant threat to workers
,
and effective restrictions on organizing labor interests are
maintained
.
Commanding an industry that provides the
majority of government revenue would carry with it the
consequent ability to influence policy decisions and
political appointments. Such a condition would compel a
mutually agreeable relationship to develop between
government and the privat interest, providing one was not
able to totally coopt the power of the other.
c. Mass Consent
The ability to generate a signifigant segment of
the population into support, or at least acceptance of
issues, actions and beliefs, is the ultimate socio-political
power base. It is, in other words, the ability to
52Alexander Hamilton, "The Federalist" (No. 79)
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manipulate the will of the people. In one way or another,
it is the object other power contenders seek to control, in
either a positive or negative fashion. For example,
economic influecne can be used to motivate labor support
through a system promising just rewards and advancements, or
it can induce submissive acquiesence by effective threats to
life and livelihood.
Electorally, mass consent is the essence of true
democracy. Those who have the capacity and skill to
aggregate mass consent through parties, interest groups and
movements, are allowed entry to the political process by
this display of power. Elections are its measure and
confirmation. 53 This is the preferred method of the middle
and enlightened lower classes in general. Mass consent is
the power capability of the majority. Economic and Violence
are minority capabilities.
d. International Support
Relative importance of this power source has
only recently gained considerable strength in El Salvador,
due to the increase in international political
interdependence, and the heightened attention given to the
country's situation. The effectiveness of this external
intervention is a direct result of the vulnerability of the
country's economic system. Total dependence on an export
economy which entailed the absorption of subsistence
farmlands and minimal industrial development for internal
markets, results in a country with inadequate means for
self-sufficiency. Disruption of the export system, whether
by external sanctions or internal sabotouge, leaves the
state wide open for intervention.
"Anderson, Charles W. , "Toward a Theory of Latin
American Politics", in Conflict and Violence in Latin
American Politics, Moreno, J. anofMi t rani B . ectsT"; TTew York
Thomas I. Crowell Co., 19/1.
49
International assistance is manifest in the form
of direct material aid and moral, political support or
diplomatic pressure. The most significant players in this
area have been Cuba, with Soviet support, and the U.S., both
having ideological ties and foreign policy interests in
support of the opposing sides. Other countries, such as
Mexico and France, have provided political support to the
left in furtherence of the socio-political change they
represent
.
B. ANALYSIS OF RELATIVE BARGAINING POWERS WITHIN EL
SALVADOR
1. Conservatives : Oligarchic Power
The basis of the conservative's strength lies in the
control of economic institutions, acheived through
oligopolistic control of the means of production and revenue
as well as a virtual monopoly on technical expertise in
state commercial and financial operations. From this
foundation, manipulation of other forms of power was
effected. This economic domination, as previously
discussed, was successful in exploiting the rural working
class by maintaining a situation where profound competition
for employment coupled with repression of organization
developed a subservient dependence of the worker to the
landowner. Coupled with the peasants' traditional respect
for patron authority, elites harnessed peasant loyalty and
confined the outlet of frustration to intra-class
expressions. this was manifest in ready access to peasant
informers, security force recruits, and even political
support
.
The means of institutional violence were controlled
by regualtion of military salaries and the offer of special
pecuniary and social rewards to responsive militry men.
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Peasants, which the armed forces are dependent upon for
soldiers, were provided steady employment and protection
from the network of security forces which they became a part
of. This constitutes the basis from which the intelligence
and paramilitary organizations have maintained their
manpower supply. As Chele Medrano , the founder of ORDEN,
has said; "peasants were given a card, gun and pay, and the
promise of protection by the National Guard." 54
Of even more importance is the oft mentioned
alliance between the oligarchy and officer corps. As the
military provides the only means for protecting the wealth
and exclusionary system of the elite, payments to officers
in terms of "outright gifts (cash, cars, houses), privileges
(vacations, credit), and favors (uncollected loans)", became
accepted as a "neccessary bussiness expense." Immunity from
investigation and prosecution enticed some officers to
diversify their endeavors into such illegal activities as
smuggling, gambling and prostitution. 55 Knowledge of such
affairs could easily provide another means of suasion.
Within the military, fierce loyalties are instilled within
each graduating class (tanda) from the military school. The
alliances and coalitions within and amongst tandas serve to
promote a common bond of fear to protect both the personal
and corporate interests of the officers. One Slavadoran
analyst suggests that a "vast network of corruption" exists
in this system, and represents the true power today. 56 The
bottom line is that the motivation of officers so involved
5
"Miami Herald, 11 February, 1980.
55 McDonald, Ronald H. , "Civil-Military Relations in
Central America: The Dilemmas of Political
Institutionalization", in Rift and Revolution
the Central American Imbroglio . Wiarda, Howard , ed.
Washington and London: American Institute for Policy
Research, 1984. pp. 129-166.
56 Gomez, Leonel, "El Salvador: The Current Danger.




to resist political change thus becomes synergistically
entwined with the interests of the economic elite.
In the more recent modernization period, the growth
of social untest and political mobilization of the
population and decrease in leverage over the military,
induced the more militant of the conservative faction to
resort to increased non-institutional violence to supress
disorder. Paramilitary organizations were formed to
terrorize peasants and protect elite interests in much the
same fashion as the private armies of the early nineteenth
century. These groups utilized the same active and reserve
military and other personnel who shared the same interests
of stability and linked to the motivations described above.
With the exception of ORDEN, which originally was directly
affiliated with the National Guard until outlawed in 1979,
the "death squads" were outside the official control of the
armed forces, and therefore more responsive to the
particular desires of reactionary conservatives. 57
Another tactic that has been effectively utilized in
the past to promote the legitimacy of their actions is the
use and massaging of idealogical symbols. Maintenance of
the status quo was projected as being essential to the
security and viability of the nation itself. The economic
and political system was portrayed as being grounded on
principles of democratic free enterprise and the sanctity of
private property rights. Threats to the existing order of
things were anti-democratic and Communist inspired, and
detrimental to the common good. Internal consumption became
even more important with the introduction of greater
political participation. Conversely, with growing political
awareness came less acceptance of this tenent . It was also
Although independent of institutional forces, the
actions of the death squads have been known to a large
majority of officers. Ibid.
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important for international consumption, in attempting to
maintain or gain support of fraternal right wing Latin
American governments and Western capitalist countries (most
importantly the United States).
2. Revolutionaries : Armed Opposition
Faced with the formidable objective of the overthrow
of a regime possessing the powers (government resources, and
the legal legitimacy of a status quo government) and resolve
of an entrenched status quo (determination of an advantaged
group in power not to yield its status), the only means
possible is through the use of violence. This is especially
true in a political culture that accepts violence as a means
for gaining political access, and is readily used by the
parties in power. The strategy of the radical left is to
erode the resolve of the military and population in general
in their support of the regime, and to destroy the power
base of the ruling clique. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare
are the tactics employed to accomplish these ends. Attacks
are made on infrastructures (power stations, farms, and
transportation) to disrupt the economy and increase social
discontent. Militarily, a war of attrition is conducted by
ambushes, hit-and-run encounters. Direct force
confrontations are attempted only with heavily favored odds.
At the same time, propaganda is used to instill ideas of how
discouraged soldiers can be free of their situation.
Prisoners are treated well and released so they may relate
their experience with the guerrillas.
In addition to military success, the guerrilla
campaign is dependent on gaining signifigant and increasing
popular support , without which they could not enlarge
operations to develop a general insurrection. In the mid
seventies, the rebels discovered that terrorist acts alone
did not attract much support; the increase in harsh
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repression usually fell on less radical dissidents, and the
sabatogue often effected the lower class workers more than
the wealthy. Formation of coalitions with popular
organizations provided the additional tactics of civil
disobedience and increased the rebel base of popular
support. Greater acceptance and respect for the cause was
gained through the increased exposure of social injustices,
the regime could be discredited further in this manner than
through violence. The activities of the popular
organizations served to awaken international attention to
the situation as well. They were so effective as to be a
major factor in precipitating the coup of 1979. Since the
formation of the FDR in 1980, this combined political arm of
the movement has been the vehicle for positive publicity,
such as the appeal for a negotiated settlement. Unqualified
support for the recognition of the FDR-FMLN as a power
deserving of an equal seat at the negotiating table was
secured from France, Mexico, and, not surprisingly,
Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union. Internally, their
most recent efforts have been directed at disruption and
discrediting of the elections of 1982 and 1984. Any gain in
legitimacy of the government is a direct loss to the
insurrectionary goal.
3. Progressives : Power of the People .
Consisting primarily of the urban middle class, the
power capability of the Progressives lies in their ability
to mobilize mass support. As such, institutional controls
of violence and economic functions are sought to increase
the effectiveness of their capability. This can be seen in
the programs of the political parties; civilian control of
the military, nationalization of banks and exports,
strengthening of a democratic system (individual rights and
liberties as well as electoral democracy). Staging
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demonstrations, protests and rallies which attract hundreds
of thousands of supporters, demonstrates to the other power
contenders that this group and their interests must be
addressed.
The image of possessing popular, majority support is
the most legitimizing factor in the eyes of most of the
western world. Support from regional democratic governments
would apply additional pressure on the regime to accept
progressives into the political arena. Convincing the
United States executive and legislative branches of the
viable plurality of their party would constitute access to
amounts of material and moral aid that in a country the size
and proximity of El Salvador, has a decisive effect.
C. ANALYSIS OF RELATIVE POWER ADJUSTMENTS
Evolution of the relative bargaining strengths of the
power contenders in El Salvador exhibits a marked trend from
centralized, limited control to a diverse, mult i- factioned
contest. In general terms, the process went from one of an
all powerful", exclusive faction influencing all others into
accepting their values and interests by using coercive
methods. Social dynamics caused a gradual increase in the
resolve of other groups to insist on greater acceptance of
their values
.
The first shift entailed the sacrifice of political
authority by the elite landowners, to the military. The
oligarchy's need for hard-handed military suppression of
society to maintain their grossly advantaged position,
produced the partnership of mutual benefit. 58
The growing professionalization of the military produced
a faction interested in national concerns as much or more
than personal. The push for modernization through
58 LeoGrande & Robbins, pp. 1084-88.
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industrialization introduced further competition amongst
power contenders in the form of a rival economic elite
faction, the bourgeoisie. Although still united in their
opposition to radical reform, the internal rift caused by
differing economic priorities weakened the hold of
oligarchic domination.
Along with modernization came the attendant social
dynamics of urbanization and middle class growth. The urban
labor and middle classes are more educated, politically
aware, with more demanding expectations than what the ruling
class had to deal with before. Rising social unrest led the
regime to continue to apply coercive tactics to enforce its
interests. Not having been given any reason to alter its
perceptions of the lack of power within the lower classes
due to minimal inherent resolve to stand up for them as a
group. This was soon to change, though, with the formation
and activism of the popular organizations.
The moderate avenue of change through the political
system having been stymied in the elections of 1972 - 1977,
served to heighten the expectations of the urban middle and
lower classes. The sudden dissappointment of 1972 caused an
intense surge of relative deprivation, which was exacerbated
by the subsequent elections. Thus, the motivation for the
popular organiztions was instilled. The size and intensity
of the demonstrations, and the growing domestic and
international pressures they produced, culminated in the
Majors coup of 1979. Being faced with a display of inherent
resolve greater than ever experienced before, the powers to
be realized some action was neccessary. Hardliners, of
course, believed in the lessons of the Matanza, and felt any
action other than one displaying powerful resolve would be
exposing weakness and inviting increased radical activity.
The growing military faction of younger officers with more
progressive perceptions, managed to act first, with
assistance from the U.S.
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The next step in the process was the reduction of the
economic power base of the conservatives by the increased
application of violence by the radical left. The threat
posed by this group was enough to cause massive amounts of
capital to be pulled out of the country. Damage to revenue
producing facilities complicated the situation further, and
led to a plunging national economy. The gross domestic
product dropped from a 4% rate of growth to a 9% decline
from 1979 to 1980. A total of 139 companies were closed due
to strikes and sabotage in the same period. 59 The vast
majority of wealthy landowners left the country and
attempted to protect their interests from abroad. A
reassessment of perceptions by the military and less
hardlined bussinessmen was induced; structural reform was
neccessary to gain social order and to prevent a total loss
of their positions.
It was, therefore, only when the radicalized left showed
its extreme commitment to its interests, and the
pervasiveness of its support, was an opening made for
moderate change. The military was still completely
committed to preserving its institutional integrity, which
required protecting the constitutional integrity of the
state: This is why the first junta's expectations were
premature, and their demands unable to be met. Their
eventual resignation and alliance with the radical left was
a neccessary ingredient to strengthen both the left and the
progressive factions. Addition of the dissillusioned
moderates to the revolutionary cause provided the legitimacy
neccessary to gain greater domestic and international
support. Mexico and France granted recognition of the
FDR-FMLN as a significant political force, urging
negotiations receptive to their demands. The FDR utilized
5 Washington Post, 27 June, 1981
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this opportunity to seek increased support with the aim of





It was perceived that loss of what centrist support
remained in the government would destroy what little
legitimacy remained within the regime. If that were lost,
"another Nicaragua" would have been likely. Duarte and the
PDC represented the only hope for preventing all out civil
war. They provided the facade of legitimacy needed to stem
the flow to radicalism, and secure U.S. aid. The position
of the PDC and Duarte was strengthened through perserverence
and dedication to the consistent party goal of evolutionary
reform. Support of the military was gained allowing reforms
to continue and rightist coup attempts withstood. Free
elections have been held and a democratically selected
government is now in place. Control of political violence
and observance of human rights have improved drastically:
the level of violence in 1984 was less than half of 1983.
Agrarian reform is continuing and acheiving greater success.
Economic growth is increasing - a 1.5% growth was
experienced in 1984. S1
5
"New York Times, 29 August, 1981.
6 Report on the Situation in El Salvador, Department of
State, Washington DC, 1 December 1984 - 31 January 1985.
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V. CONCLUSION
The question remains; is there adequate bargaining space
in the present situation to enable a negotiated settlement
to be reached? Is there now a perception on the part of
effective power contenders that a negotiated solution is
better than continued conflict? The answer is yes.
The Salvadorian crisis has gone through a series of
stages leading from the original asymmetrical conditions to
the present more symmetrical state in which the hard line
positions of the conservatives are balanced by the opposite
revolutionary hard liners. The great majority of players
fall in the mid spectrum, aware of the tremendous costs of
continued conflict and the necessity for seeking resolution
through limited concessions. Of vital significance in
reaching this condition is the loss of relative bargaining
power of the two extremes.
Conservative power has been decimated by the economic
changes; nationalization of finance and export controls, and
losses due to warfare and sabotage. U.S. aid has since
replaced the agricultural monopoly of government revenue.
The heightened intensity of the conflict and the tremendous
international attention generated clarified the true values
and interests being contested, and therefore invalidated the
previously successful Communist scare tactics and defense of
democratic freedoms. The results of the elections of 1984
and 1985 proved this point when d'Aubuisson was not only
defeated, but his political association was considered a
liability by prominent businesmen of the ARENA party.
A most vital factor also publicized by the recent
elections, is the support of the military for the new
political system. As voiced by defense ministers in three
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consecutive elections, the military has shown itself
committed to non-interference in and defense of the process
and the outcome. Because of the conflict, the armed forces
have altered their perceptions and clarified their
interests. The failure of the historical strong arm tactics
of repression not only failed to suppress dissent, but aided
in promotong greater support for the opposition. Their
committment to the constitutional integrity of the nation
and the preservation of the military institution still reign
supreme, however, it is now through acceptance of a popular
democratic system (as required to receive continued U.S.
aid) which provides the best possible means for achieving
their goals
.
The revolutionaries reached their pinnacle of bargaining
power when their fight for social justice gained domestic
and international recognition as being legitimate and
neccessary. The wind was subsequently taken from their
sails by the social reforms instituted by the government and
the initiation of peace talks. Although for short from
rectifying all social ills, the advances previously
discussed addressed the very core of FDR demands. The
exceptions of reconstitution of the military and immediate
power sharing excluded, in light of their being directly
opposed to the constitutional legitimacy of the armed forces
and the new government. Harnessing human rights abuses,
agrarian reform and truly free elections resulted in the
Revolutionary Front resorting to rhetorical attempts at
illegitimizing these progressive actions. Their
uncompromising negotiating positions at AYAGUALO emptied
their public pleas for peaceful resolution of any substance.
One exception, though, is their distrust in re-entering the
system peacefully, out of fear of physical retribution.
One can logically assume that the moderates of the FDR,
with their demands either being met or in the process of
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being met, would yield in their support of armed struggle if
confidence in the maintenance of law and order were
acheived. The true revolutionaries however, are committed
to a much more encompassing goal of structural power
alteration. Their program would be expected to be one of
delaying tactics through negotiations with the hope of
formenting unrest and the re-emergence of geovernment
repression.
The answer to the question of whether conditions favor a
negotiated settlement is, then, yes. A stalmate in the
military confrontation and the reversal of power positions
from the extremes to the less hard line centrists with the
perception of the high value in a settlement has set the
stage for peaceful resolution. As mentioned, the major
obstacle is the lawlessness that still exists. Reform of
the judicial system and restoration of the rule of law would
result in cessation of civil war.
For a truly lasting solution to be accomplished,
however, the political and economic systems attempting to be
established must become institutionalized. Historically
ingrained cultural perceptions of democracy and the role of
violence must be overcome. Two possible directions can be
envisioned. The first is that progress toward a just and
participative political-social regime continues for such a
time until it is accepted as the norm. The other would be,
with the recovery of the national economy and rising world
commodity prices, a resurgence of economic elite power would
arise to subvert this process.
The only force capable of significantly assisting the
progressive forces in El Salvador and insuring continued
advancement is international support, in particular, the
United States. The present dependence of the Salvadorian
government on U.S. aid provides the unique opportunity for
the effective institutionalization of freedom and justice in
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El Salvador. Substantial loss of interest and increased
apathy on the part of the United States during this limited
time of opportunity would provide the potential for
regression which would be detrimental to the national
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